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Abstract 
Since the beginning of the crisis, many responses have been taken to stabilise the 
European markets. Pringle is the awaited judicial response of the European Court of 
Justice on the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a crisis-related 
intergovernmental international institution which provides financial assistance to 
Member States in distress in the Eurozone. The judgment adopts a welcome and 
satisfactory approach on the establishment of the ESM. This article examines the 
feasibility of the ESM under the Treaty rules and in light of the Pringle judgment. For 
the first time, the Court was called to appraise the use of the simplified revision 
procedure under article 48 TEU with the introduction of a new paragraph to article 
136 TFEU as well as to interpret the no bail out clause under article 125 TFEU. The 
final result is rather positive as the Court endorses the establishment of a stability 
mechanism of the ESM-kind beyond a strict reading of the Treaty rules. Pringle is the 
first landmark ECJ decision in which the Court has endorsed the use of new and 
flexible measures to guarantee financial assistance between Member States. This 
judgment could act as a springboard for more economic, financial and, possibly, 
political interconnections between Member States.  
 
1. Introduction 
The Pringle1 case is a seminal judgment of the European Court of Justice (hereafter 
the ‘ECJ’ or the ‘Court’) on one of the most remarkable crisis-related reforms, the 
establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (the ‘ESM’).2 The judgment is 
twofold. The first part delves into the constitutional feasibility of the simplified Treaty 
revision procedure to create the ESM, namely the insertion of a new paragraph 3 to 
Art.136 TFEU through the European Council Decision 2011/199. The second part 
deals with the right of the Eurozone Member States to conclude and ratify an 
international agreement such as the ESM by way of interpretation of the Treaty rules 
and the general principles of European Union law. The questions posed to the Court 
are new in the Lisbon environment and raise a number of interesting legal issues, 
including in relation to the constitutional impact of the ESM Treaty (hereafter the 
‘ESMT’) on the Economic and Monetary Union (‘EMU’) and, more generally, to  the 
European constitutional system.  
Before the delivery of the judgment, the adoption of the ESMT by Eurozone Member 
States had provoked a number of constitutional challenges in Member States. In 
particular, the Estonian Supreme Court was asked whether the ESMT was 
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compatible with the Estonian Constitution. The answer of the Estonian Court was 
positive.3 Furthermore, the German Constitutional Court, in a much-awaited 
judgment, was invited to assess the compatibility of the ESMT with the German 
Grundgesetz Norm. The Karlsruhe judgment on 12 September 2012 paved the way 
for the entry into force of the ESMT.4  
In Pringle, the ECJ endorses the Council Decision to amend the Treaty and declares 
the compatibility of the ESMT with the European rules brought to its attention by the 
referring Court. More importantly, the value of the Pringle judgment lies in the 
interpretation, for the first time, of a number of core EMU provisions such as the no 
bail out clause under article 125 TFEU. Pringle has the clear merits of endorsing the 
Treaty amendment of art.136 TFEU and of clarifying the relationship between the 
ESMT and the TFEU.  
Before commenting upon the most interesting issues raised by the judgment, the 
legal background and the content of the ruling will be recalled. 
 
2. The legal and factual background 
Pringle should be seen in the wider context of the EMU. As is well known, the Treaty 
of Maastricht introduced a title on Economic and Monetary Policy. This framework 
has been defined as “asymmetric”5. This is because the monetary ‘pillar’ is far more 
advanced than the economic ‘pillar’. On the one hand, since 1999, monetary policy 
competences have been transferred to the European System of Central Banks 
(ECBS) where the European Central Bank (‘ECB’) is the principal institution for 
monetary policy in the Eurozone together with national central banks. On the other 
hand, economic policy is still dominated by Member States’ competences. As to 
monetary policy, article 3(1)(c) TFEU states that the Union has an exclusive 
competence. As to economic policy, the wording of article 5(1) TFEU affirms that “the 
Member States shall coordinate their economic policies within the Union (...)”. 
Economic policy is still retained by Member States and the EU has not been 
conferred any specific competence except from a role of coordination. Member 
States’ competences in the economic policy framework are still ‘considerable’.6    
The imbalance between monetary and economic policy has been stigmatized by the 
outbreak of the financial crisis. The limited competences of the Union to control and 
supervise Member States’ budgets have had a clear impact on the EMU framework. 
Member States have been obliged to resort to special arrangements to assure 
liquidity to weaker Member States in the short run. These measures have taken the 
form of bilateral loans to Greece followed by loan facilities to Member States in 
economic distress. The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) were established for this purpose.7  
In order to ensure balance and sustainable growth, during the European Council 
meeting of 28 and 29 October 2010, the Heads of State and of Government 
                                                          
3 See the English translation to the Estonian’s Supreme Court judgment of 12 July 2012 available at 
http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=1347  
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the Eurozone Member States and had a lending capacity of €440 billion. See more extensively, Alberto 
de Gregorio Merino, op .cit., 1615-1621. 
convened on the need for the Member States to create a permanent crisis 
mechanism in order to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area. The 
President of the European Council agreed to undertake consultations for an 
amendment of the Treaty required to that effect. Heads of State and Government 
agreed that, as this permanent mechanism would be designed to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole, art. 122 paragraph 2 TFEU would no 
longer be needed. Hence, on 16 December 2010 the Belgian Government submitted 
a proposal for the review of article 136 TFEU, pursuant to art. 48 paragraph 6 TEU, 
with a view to add a paragraph 3 to that article. Decision 2011/233 was adopted on 
25 March 2011.  
This European Council decision adds a new paragraph to article 136 TFEU 
according to which: “The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the 
euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the 
mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality”. According to article 2 of the 
decision, Member States proceeded with the completion of procedures for the 
approval of the decision in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. The amendment entered into force on 1 January 2013.  
At the same time, Member States whose currency is the euro concluded the ESMT 
with a view to assume the tasks of the EFSF and the EFSM. The ESM is a 
Luxembourg-based international organisation composed of a Board of Governors, a 
Board of Directors and a Managing Director. The ESM would provide, where needed, 
financial assistance to euro area Member States.8 Following the adoption of the 
ESMT, all the euro area Member States have proceeded with the ratification of the 
ESMT according to their constitutional requirements and have paved the way for the 
entry into force of the agreement before the actual entry into force of the Treaty 
amendment. 
The ESMT provides a mechanism of financial assistance to Eurozone Member 
States in financial difficulties, subject to the requirement of strict conditionality. When 
a Eurozone Member State in distress needs financial assistance, the parties involved 
would prepare and sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which shall reflect 
the severity of the weaknesses to be addressed in order to receive assistance.9 The 
ESMT provides for a number of options to assist the Eurozone Member States. 
Financial assistance might be used to recapitalize the financial institutions of a 
specific Member State.10 The ESM can provide precautionary financial assistance 
when the economic condition of a Member State is sound enough to retain access to 
the market, but financial aid is necessary in order to avoid a crisis.11 Further, the 
ESM can grant loans to Eurozone Member States who have lost access to financial 
markets either through excessive costs or lack of lenders. The Primary Market 
Support Facility (PMSF) allows the ESM to buy bonds in the primary bond market of 
the Eurozone Member State either to facilitate that it returns to the financial markets 
or to increase the efficiency of other ESM financial aid.12 Intervention in the 
secondary bond markets is designed to reduce interest rates in the secondary market 
and to help Eurozone Members struggling with the refinancing of their banking 
systems.13 At the time of writing, Spain has been the first Eurozone Member State to 
make use of the ESM funds. It has been granted financial assistance to recapitalize 
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the country’s banking sector.14 More recently, Cyprus has been granted financial 
assistance through the ESM in the aftermath of its banking crisis in early 2013.15 
The ESM entrusts the EU institutions with crucial tasks in granting and supervising 
financial assistance. The European Commission and the ECB assess the needed 
financial needs16 as well as the sustainability of the Member State’s public debt and 
the corresponding risk of financial stability to the Eurozone as a whole.17 Following 
the decision to grant aid and in liaison with the ECB, the Commission negotiates the 
MoU with the concerned Member State.18 Thereafter, the Commission signs the MoU 
on behalf of the ESM.19 In the implementing phase, the ESM and the ECB monitor 
compliance with the conditionality laid down in the MoU.20 Finally, the ECJ is 
entrusted with the task of adjudicating disputes between the ESM and a Member 
State or among several Member States relating to the interpretation and application 
of the ESMT when a decision of the Board on the matter is contested.21 
During the process of ratification of the ESMT Mr. Pringle brought an action before 
the High Court of Ireland. In turn, he contested the lawful adoption of the Decision 
2011/199 because, in amending the Treaty, it entailed an alteration of the 
competences of the EU and it was inconsistent with EU rules on economic and 
monetary policy and with general principles of EU law. Further, the claimant asserted 
that the entry into force of the ESM would create obligations to Ireland which, among 
others, would be in contravention with the Treaty rules on economic and monetary 
policy and would encroach with the exclusive competence of the Union in relation to 
monetary policy. Then, he criticized that the creation of an autonomous and 
permanent international institution would circumvent the rules contained in the Treaty 
as regards economy and monetary policy. 
Following the claims brought forward by Mr. Pringle, the Irish High Court dismissed 
his action in its entirety. Mr. Pringle appealed before the Supreme Court of Ireland 
which decided to refer a number of questions to the Court of Justice for preliminary 
ruling.22 Given the urgency of the subject, the ECJ applied the accelerated 
procedure. The case was assigned to the full Court.     
 
3. The judgment  
Following the A.G. Kokott ‘views’ on 26 October 2012,23 the Court delivered its 
judgment on 27 November 2012. The Court’s judgment comprises three questions. 
3.1 The first question: the validity of Decision 199/2011 
The first question referred to the Court concerns the validity of the Treaty amendment 
of article 136 TFEU and the use of the simplified revision procedure under article 48 
paragraph 6 TEU.  
After having established that the Court has jurisdiction and that the question is 
admissible,24 the Court scrutinises the impact of the amendment to the TFEU and 
ascertains whether the effects of such amendment concern solely provisions of Part 
Three of that Treaty and whether such amendment increases the competences 
                                                          
14 Relevant information on the Spanish financial assistance programme can be found at 
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16 Ibidem, Article 13. 
17 Id.. 
18 Ibidem, Article 13.3. 
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20 Ibidem, Article 13.7. 
21 Ibidem, Article 37.3. 
22 See Pringle v. Ireland, [2012] IESC 47, para.5 (S. C.) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.courts.ie/__80256F2B00356A6B.nsf/0/E7504392B159245080257A4C00517D6A?Open&Hig
hlight=0,Pringle,~language_en     
23 A. G. Kokott View on Pringle delivered on 26 October 2012. 
24 Pringle judgment, paras 30-44. 
attributed on the Union in the Treaties. The ECJ reaches the conclusion that the ESM 
pursues the objective of maintaining the stability of the euro area as a whole whereas 
the Eurosystem pursues the objective of price stability. The Court observes that it is 
clear that the establishment of the ESM does not encroach on the monetary policy as 
the ESM’s objective “to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, that is 
clearly distinct from the objective of maintaining price stability, which is the primary 
objective of the Union’s monetary policy. Even though the stability of the euro area 
may have repercussions on the stability of the currency used within that area, an 
economic policy measure cannot be treated as equivalent to a monetary policy 
measure for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects on the stability of the 
euro.”.25 Further, it specifies that the ESM has the primary objective of managing 
financial crises which might arise and does complement the new regulatory 
framework for strengthened economic governance of the Union as envisaged in a 
number of new measures.26 It follows that the establishment of that mechanism does 
not encroach upon the exclusive competence of monetary policy held by the Union 
and does not affect the restricted role of the Union in the area of economic policy.27 
The Court concludes that Decision 199/2011 satisfies the conditions established 
under article 48 paragraph 6 TEU by means of a simplified revision procedure. 
Subsequently, the Court concludes that Decision 199/2011 does not establish any 
new competence on the Union as the Treaty amendment does not create any legal 
basis for the Union and is silent as to any possible role for the Union’s institutions in 
the field.28  
3.2 The second question: the right to conclude and ratify the ESMT and EU law 
The Court subsequently focuses on the question whether the power to conclude and 
ratify an agreement such as the ESMT is compatible with some European Treaty 
articles.  
On substance, the Court analyses the provisions relating to the exclusive 
competence of the Union in the monetary policy and the power to conclude 
international agreements. With regard to the monetary policy competence, the ECJ 
denies that the role and the tasks of the ESM would fall within the monetary policy 
under the TFEU. According to articles 3 and 12(1) of the ESMT, the ESM is not 
entitled to set the key interest rates for the euro area or to issue euro currency, but it 
seeks to provide financial assistance entirely granted by the ESM from paid-in capital 
or by the issue of financial instruments.29 Furthermore, the Court recalls that even if 
the activities of the ESM might have an influence on the rate of inflation, such 
influence would constitute “only indirect consequence of the economic policy 
measures adopted”.30  
As to article 3 paragraph 2 TFEU on the exclusive power to conclude international 
agreements, the Court states that the ESM does not affect common rules or alter 
their scope.31  
Further, the Court conducts an extensive analysis on the interpretation of the ESM 
with the economic coordination provisions under articles 2(3) TFEU, 119 TFEU to 
121 TFEU and 126 TFEU. 
The judgment states that “the ESM is not concerned with the coordination of the 
economic policies of the Member States, but rather constitutes a financing 
mechanism”.32 Even though the Court distinguishes between the ESM’s 
conditionality and economic policy coordination, it emphasises that the ESM comes 
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26 Ibidem, paras 58 and 59. 
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28 Ibidem, paras 73-75. 
29 Ibidem, para. 96. 
30 Ibidem, para. 97. 
31 Ibidem, para. 107. 
32 Ibidem, para. 110. 
within the economic policy element of the EMU as the conditionality attached to the 
ESM stability support shall be compatible with the TFEU-based coordination of 
economic policies.33 Similarly, the Court excludes that the ESM affects the excessive 
deficit procedure under article 126 as the ESMT, provides “that the conditions 
imposed on ESM Members who receive financial assistance must be consistent with 
any recommendation which the Council might issue under [the excessive deficit 
procedure]”.34 . It holds that the nature of the ESM is “to mobilise funding and to 
provide financial stability support to ESM Members who are experienced, or 
threatened by severe financial problems”.35  
Then, the Court interprets the ESM in light of articles 123 and 125 TFEU. First, the 
Court specifies that article 123 TFEU is addressed specifically to the ECB and to the 
central banks of the Member States and not to Member States as a whole which are 
entitled to create mechanisms of financial stability and are not covered by that 
provision.36 Second, the Court examines more in details the spirit of the provision of 
art.125 TFEU. Even if not in such a detailed way as the Advocate General did,37 the 
Court stresses that “the ESM will not act as guarantor of the debts of the recipient 
Member State by referring to the spirit of the article inserted by the Treaty of 
Maastricht. In fact, the latter will remain responsible to its creditors for its financial 
commitments”.38 The nature of that rule, as it can be seen in the preparatory work 
relating to the Treaty of Maastricht, lies in the aim of the Article itself which is to 
ensure that the Member States follow a sound budgetary policy by assuring that they 
are subject to the logics of the market when they enter into debt. Hence, the ECJ 
concludes that the no bail out clause is not infringed by  
“the granting of financial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member 
State which remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors provided that the 
conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to 
implement a sound budgetary policy”.39   
Further, the judgment is devoted to the interpretation of article 13 TEU which 
provides that each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it 
by the Treaty. First, the Court examines the role allocated to the Commission and to 
the ECB. It recalls that, in cases of non-exclusive competences of the Union, 
Member States can confer powers to the Union institutions, on condition that the 
Member States do not alter the essential character of the powers conferred on those 
institutions by the Treaties. Moreover, the provisions of the Treaty do not establish a 
specific competence to establish a permanent stability mechanism. Article 20 TEU on 
enhanced cooperation does not preclude a role for the Commission and the ECB in 
the ESM.40   
As to the role allocated to the Court, the judgment confirms that article 273 TFEU 
does not preclude the possibility to conference a judicial role to the Court in cases of 
international agreement outside the Union framework. On the contrary, the conditions 
laid out in the ESMT under article 37 appear consistent with the provision under 
article 273 TFEU.41    
3.3 The third question: whether the Member States may conclude and ratify the ESM 
Treaty before the entry into force of Decision 2011/199 
Finally, the Court assesses whether the Member States can conclude and ratify the 
ESM Treaty before the entry into force of Decision 199/2011. Very briefly, the Court 
                                                          
33 Ibidem, paras 111-112. 
34 Ibidem, para. 113. 
35 Ibidem, para. 110. 
36 Ibidem, para. 125. 
37 A.G. Kokott View, paras 100-166.  
38 Pringle judgment, para. 138. 
39 Ibidem, para. 137. 
40 Ibidem, paras 168-169. 
41 Ibidem, paras 171-177. 
states that that decision does not confer any new power to the Member States and, 
thus, concludes that the ESM Treaty is not subject to the entry into force of Decision 
2011/199.42  
 
4. Commentary 
The ruling in the Pringle case is a seminal ECJ judgment.43 The Court endorses the 
amendment of article 136 TFEU and concludes that the ESMT is compatible with the 
rules of the Treaty. It was a rather awaited judgment, especially because of the 
incumbent entry into operation of the ESMT and the need to provide rapidly a safety 
net for Member States in distress. The full Court constitutes the ECJ “bail out” of the 
ESM. This is for two reasons. 
First, by clarifying the extent of powers to exercise the Treaty amendment powers 
under article 48 TEU, the Court allows the revision of article 136 TFEU.  
Second, the judgment, for the first time since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, 
analyses core provisions in the economic and monetary policy title (in particular 
articles 122-126 TFEU) and it clarifies the extent of power to provide financial 
assistance between Member States. The judgment legitimizes the possibility to use 
an international instrument between Member States to reinforce financial assistance 
in the Eurozone. Such solution appears feasible and the judgment itself stands out as 
a significant precedent with a view to take further action to reduce the impact of the 
financial crisis.  
After having briefly mentioned some aspects on admissibility and jurisdiction, the 
commentary will address the extent of powers to conclude an international 
agreement as it happened for the ESM. Then, it will concentrate on the extent of 
revision powers in the Treaties in the context of economic and monetary policy. 
Finally, it will assess the judicial interpretation of the Treaty rules on economic and 
monetary policy with particular emphasis on the no bail out clause under article 125 
TFEU. 
 
4.1 Admissibility and Jurisdiction  
4.1.1 Jurisdiction 
The new Lisbon framework did not pose particular problems to the Court to exercise 
its jurisdiction on the case. The Court affirms that it has jurisdiction under the Treaty 
to establish the feasibility on the use of the simplified revision procedure under article 
48 paragraph 6 TEU.  
Competences and powers of the EU have been substantially increased and it is no 
surprise that Decision 199/2011 can be subject to the Court jurisdiction. This is 
because the European Council has become a stand-alone EU institution with the 
power to adopt decisions which can, in principle, be subject to the Court 
jurisdiction.44 This is the first time that the Court pronounces itself on the new 
simplified revision procedure introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The position of the 
Court is quite clear in affirming its jurisdiction as article 48 paragraph 6 TEU does not 
specify which institution has jurisdiction on the revision procedure. It was already 
held that the Court would be involved on disputes about the scope of article 48 6 
TEU.45 This has been precisely the case. 
 
                                                          
42 Ibidem, paras 184-185. 
43 At the time of writing some commentaries on Pringle have been published: V. Borger, “The ESM and 
the European Court’s Predicament in Pringle” and P. Van Malleghem, “Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the 
European Union’s Monetary Constitution”, German Law Journal 1/2013; P. Craig, “Guest Editorial 
Article”, Maastricht Journal on Comparative and European Law, 1/2013; Bruno de Witte and Thomas 
Beukers, “The Court of Jiustice approves the creation of the European Stability Mechanism outside the 
EU legal order: Pringle”, in 50 CMLRev., 805-848. 
44 Article 13 TEU and article 267 TFEU. 
45 Bruno De Witte, “The reform of the revision rules by the Lisbon Treaty”, in Eeckhout, Biondi and 
Ripley, EU law after Lisbon, Oxford, OUP, 124. 
 
4.1.2 Admissibility 
As to the first question, the Court reaffirms the TWD doctrine and excludes that Mr. 
Pringle had standing before the Court for a direct challenge to the European Council 
decision.  
Under article 263 paragraph 4 TFEU “[a]ny natural or legal person may (...) institute 
proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and 
individual concern to them (...)”.In other words, any natural or legal person shall 
demonstrate that the Union act is addressed to him or that it is of direct and individual 
concern to him in order to have standing before the ECJ. 46 Differently, an indirect 
challenge to a Union act – in casu the decision of the European Council - can be 
made through the preliminary ruling procedure under article 267 TFEU without any 
specific condition on the standing.  
As it is well established in the Court case law, the TWD doctrine maintains that if an 
individual has locus standi for bringing an annulment action before the European 
judicature – id est the Union act is of direct and individual concern to it - and such 
action is not exercised in due time, a preliminary ruling on the same matter is 
inadmissible.47 Mr. Pringle had not, beyond any doubt, direct and individual concern 
to bring action against Decision 2011/199. This is because the challenged decision is 
an act of general application and does not directly and individually concern Mr 
Pringle. It flows from the content of the Decision itself that it did not apply as such to 
a limited category of individuals among which Mr. Pringle.48 On the contrary, the 
decision is of general application. This was uncontested and the Court has correctly 
declared the action as admissible.  
As to the second question, it is well established that preliminary rulings are an 
instrument of judicial cooperation that allow the Court of Justice to provide “national 
courts with the criteria for the interpretation of European Union law which they need 
to decode the dispute before them”.49 However, a number of conditions need to be 
respected for the preliminary ruling order. As to the one contested in the Pringle 
case, the order of reference should give sufficient information on the Treaty rules 
invoked. Accordingly, both the Court and the Advocate General contended that some 
provisions indicated in the order of reference did not come into question for the 
outcome of the dispute. In particular, the Court stresses that articles 2 and 3 TEU do 
not come within the scope of the second question. This position reinforces the duty 
on the part of the referring court to specify the EU provisions they ask for reference to 
the benefit of the national proceedings.     
 
4.2 Substance  
4.2.1 Judicial endorsement of international agreements outside the EU legal 
framework? 
The Pringle judgment raises three questions on the extent of powers to conclude and 
ratify the ESMT under EU external relations law. First, the judgment questions the 
conclusion of an international agreement outside the EU legal framework. Second, it 
                                                          
46 Note, however, that the Lisbon Treaty added a new indent to article 263 paragraph 4 TFEU according 
to which “any natural or legal person (...) may institute proceedings (...) against a regulatory act which is 
of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures” (emphasis added).    
47 Case C-188/92, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECR [1994] I-
00833, paras 23-24. The TWD Textilewerke Deggendorf case concerned the reimbursement of an 
unlawfully granted aid. The German Government informed the company, and told it also to the 
Commission’s decision could be challenged under art.263 TFEU. The company did not challenge the 
Commission’s decision, but instead sought to raise the legality of the Commission’s decision via the 
national courts. See also case C-550/09, E and F, [2010] ECR I-6213, paras 45-46. On the TWD 
doctrine see more extensively Roland Schwensfeier, “The TWD principle post-Lisbon”, (2012) 37 E. L. 
Rev., 156–175. 
48 Pringle judgment, para. 42. 
49 Ibidem, para. 83.  
affirms the use of the Commission and the ECB institutions in cases outside the 
Union legal framework. Third, it assesses article 273 TFEU and the role of the Court 
itself in the framework of the ESM. 
First, it is clear that the EST Treaty was concluded as an inter se international 
agreement, thus between some Member States and outside the Union framework. 
This is because the Treaty does not contain rules to provide permanent financial 
assistance to Member States in distress. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty 
contains rules, codified from case law, that give exclusive competences to the Union 
for the conclusion of international agreements with international organizations and 
third countries. In particular, article 3 paragraph 2 TFEU affirms that the Union has 
exclusive competence to conclude an international agreement in so far as its 
conclusion would “affect common rules or alter their scope”. Correctly, the Court 
excludes that the ESMT refers to those situations. However, it makes two mistakes. 
First, article 3 paragraph 2 TFEU refers to international agreements with third 
countries and not between Member States. It appears that reference to such article is 
wrong as the ESMT is an international agreement between Member States and not 
with third states or international organizations. Second, the Court holds that the 
ESMT neither affects common rules nor alters their scope.50 The ESMT shall not be 
seen as an initiative impinging on exclusive or shared competences of the Union, in 
casu monetary policy. The Court clearly states that the ESMT shall be considered 
within economic policy, even if this area is not - strictly speaking - a common policy 
within the meaning of article 3 paragraph 2 TFEU. This argument serves the Court to 
conclude that the ESM does not affect common rules because economic policy is not 
an area of common rules. This assumption, however, does not exclude any duty on 
the part of Member States. In fact, the Court reaffirms the Gottardo case law 
according to which, even when concluding international agreements outside EU 
competences, Member States need to comply with EU law when exercising their 
competence in their reserved competence area.51 
Second, the judgment gives some interesting indications on the use of Union 
institutions in international agreements.52 Pringle gives ground to the Court to assess 
the use of the Commission, the ECB and the Court itself in situations where EU 
institutions are given competences outside the Union framework. Some case law 
already existed and is mentioned by the Court. The Court refers to the Bangladesh 
case53 and to the Lomé case.54 The Bangladesh case concerned the constitution of a 
fund of aid to Bangladesh as an extra-EU instrument. The European Parliament 
challenged the validity of a collective decision by all Member States to grant such aid 
and to confer power to the Commission to manage that aid to be given. In the Lomé 
case the European Parliament contested a decision of the Council to establish a 
system outside the EU budgetary procedure to administer Member States’ 
assistance to some third countries within the framework of the Lomé Convention.  
This reference to the previous case law allows the Court to affirm in Pringle that 
additional tasks can be conferred to Union institutions so long as they “do not alter 
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the essential character of the powers conferred on those institutions by the EU and 
FEU Treaties.”55  
Paragraph 158 confirms that the Bangladesh and Lomé case law is still good law and 
that Member States can confer additional tasks to the Union institutions also when 
they use the intergovernmental means or they act outside the Union framework. 
However, one may argue whether the doctrine according to which it is possible by 
international agreements to confer additional functions to EU institutions, so long as 
the basic competences of the EU are not affected has not been stretched too much. 
In other words, to what extent may EU institutions be “borrowed” for international 
arrangements between Member States? Some conditions need to be respected: the 
Union shall not have exclusive competence; the tasks conferred to EU institutions 
shall not entail any power to make decision of their own; and the additional tasks 
shall not alter the essential character of the powers conferred to them by the 
Treaties. Unfortunately, the Court does not go more on the details of each condition 
and bases its reasoning on previous case law rather than proposing some grounds to 
assess them.  
More clarifications were needed if one looks precisely at the EU institutions’ powers 
under the ESMT. It is true that the Board of Governors plays a central role in the 
ESM. It acts as the main body to take decisions to grant financial assistance to 
Member States in difficulty. The Commission and the ECB should only play a role of 
assistance. However, the ESMT suggests that both the Commission and the ECB 
can exert some quasi-decisional powers. A strict reading of the ESMT would suggest 
that these powers would run counter to the second condition mentioned by the Court.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the use of Union institutions and the enhanced 
cooperation under article 20 TEU needed further clarifications. According to this 
article Member States may make use of enhanced cooperation between themselves 
within the framework of the Union's non-exclusive competences by making use of 
Union institutions. The applicant argued that Article 20 TEU on enhanced 
cooperation should be used. This argument is correctly rejected by the Court as 
article 20 TEU refers only to cases where the Union has competences to establish a 
permanent mechanism and this was not the case.56 Regrettably, the Court fails to 
give more indications on how to use the procedure under article 20 TEU. Would the 
enhanced cooperation procedure under article 20 TEU be used in areas covered by 
Union policies? 
Third, Pringle sheds some light on the interpretation of article 273 TFEU. This 
provision affirms that the Court “shall have jurisdiction in any dispute between 
Member States which relates to the subject matter of the Treaties if the dispute is 
submitted to it under a special agreement between the parties”. It serves to avoid a 
divergent interpretation of EU law by other jurisdictions and to assure unity in the 
interpretation of EU law.57 Accordingly, the ESMT states that if decisions of the Board 
of Governors are contested, the dispute is submitted to the Court of Justice.  
The Court’s reasoning of Article 273 TFEU is quite open on the reading of this article. 
First, the Court recognizes that article 273 TFEU may be invoked also ex ante causa. 
It means that it is not necessary that the actual dispute has arisen.58 Second, the 
subject matter of the dispute concerns the Treaties, and a fortiori EU law, as the 
ESMT requires that the stability support be fully consistent with EU law.59 However, 
one may question the fact that the Court affirms that the dispute will be likely to 
concern the interpretation or application of EU law. Does this mean that in some 
cases the Court’s jurisdiction will not be in place as regards EMS Treaty disputes? 
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The Court does not give hints on this. Finally, the Court considers that disputes 
where international organisations are party may be submitted to it.60 This reaffirms 
the extensive interpretation of the Court on article 273 TFEU.  
Overall, the Court’s reading on article 273 TFEU is a welcome development. It is 
submitted that the Court adopts an extensive and open interpretation on the 
possibility to conclude international agreements outside the Union framework and to 
make use of EU institutions to that effect. This might reinforce Member States to rely 
on international agreements concluded between each other in order to tackle the 
debt crisis in future. The role of the Commission and the ECB would be useful to 
these purposes.  
 
4.2.2 The extent of simplified revision powers and the ESM: between policies and 
competences 
Preliminarily, it must be stated that the revision of article 136 paragraph 3 was not 
necessary to the entry into force of the ESMT. The third question before the ECJ 
explicitly affirms that “Decision 2011/199 confirms the existence of a power 
possessed by the Member States”.61 It is clear that the entry into force of the Treaty 
amendment did not affect the power to adopt the ESMT alone. This conclusion 
questions whether the Treaty amendment is necessary to adopt international 
agreements between Member States to establish permanent financial assistance 
facilities. Does article 136 paragraph 3 TFEU really add a new legal dimension to 
international agreements between Member States or is the amendment only the 
result of a political compromise between Member States and the EU institutions? 
Having said that, it is important to appraise the simplified revision procedure as 
Pringle gives significant indications on the relationship between the simplified 
revision procedure under article 48 TEU and the nature of the EMU. 
Revision procedures are contained in article 48 TEU. The Treaty provides for an 
ordinary and a simplified revision procedure. As underlined above,62 the first question 
concerned the possibility to amend the Treaty through the simplified revision 
procedure of article 48 TEU paragraph 6 by inserting a third indent to article 136 
TFEU.  
The functionality of the simplified revision procedure is to avoid recourse to the 
ordinary revision procedure where a Convention composed of the members of the 
Member States’ governments is necessary. According to the simplified revision 
procedure, the proposed amendment will be adopted directly by the European 
Council acting by unanimity of its members without a Convention. However, two 
essential conditions are necessary to make use of article 48 TEU: first, the 
amendment shall concern solely the provisions of Part Three of the TFEU on Union 
internal policies and actions (articles 26-197 TFEU); second, the revision shall not 
increase competences conferred on the Union by the Treaties.63 The Court assesses 
them in turn and comes to the conclusion that the amendment is compatible with the 
procedure under article 48 TEU. It is the first time that the Court interprets article 48 
TEU and the conditions therein. This allows us to make some comments on this 
contentious part of the judgment.  
First, it is important to note that the content of the article amendment refers to the 
possibility to allow the conclusion of an international treaty, such as the ESM and not 
a Union arrangement. This shows that the simplified amendment procedure can also 
be used to insert provisions that do not necessarily concern EU law. Member States 
are still distinct entities from the EU.   
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Second, and more interestingly, the essential question that the Court addresses is 
whether the new amendment impinges on monetary and economic policy. It is well 
known that the EMU is composed of two “pillars”: monetary policy and economic 
policy.64 The former is an exclusive competence; the latter is a “peculiar” competence 
reserved to Member States through a system of coordination of economic policies.65 
The Court has the opportunity to interpret the concept of “economic” and “monetary” 
policies as contained in the Treaty. However, the Court appears to limit its 
interpretation by stating that the EU’s economic policy competence has a merely 
coordinating nature. In such way, the Court does not recognize that the Union 
competence in this field can go beyond the simple coordination, but can include also 
financial assistance as shown by article 122 paragraph 1 TFEU.66   
The Court’s conclusion on the Treaty amendment is clear: the amendment of article 
136 TFEU concern solely economic policy and not monetary policy which therefore is 
not altered by the new provision.67 This reasoning is remarkable as it allows for future 
use of the simplified revision procedure in the EMU Title whenever the envisaged 
revision does not impinge on monetary policy stricto sensu. Even if financial 
assistance measures “may have indirect effects on the stability of the euro” 
(emphasis added), it can be argued that paragraph 56 gives ground to reform 
economic policy measures through the simplified revision procedure. In other words, 
the simplified revision procedure can be used even if the amendment has effects on 
the stability of the euro, but only indirectly on price stability, thus on monetary policy.  
An example could be the use of the simplified revision procedure to put forward 
amendments to create the Banking Union as long as the proposed amendment does 
not directly impinge on monetary policy. However, it is difficult to believe that the 
procedure under article 48 paragraph 6 TEU may be used to reform the Treaty on 
prudential supervision of credit institutions. Article 127 paragraph 5 TFEU, which 
refers to the role of the ECSB to “contribute to the smooth conduct of policies 
pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and the stability of the financial system”, is a provision contained in the 
monetary policy chapter. A restrictive reading of the article 48 paragraph 6 TEU 
conditions would exclude the use of the simplified amendment provision to change 
the Treaty on the role of the ESCB in banking supervision. However, one might argue 
whether article 127 paragraph 5 TFEU does really refer to the core of monetary 
policy or rather to the “indirect” effects of the ECSB’s activities on monetary policy. If 
we follow the second interpretation, it is submitted that article 48 paragraph 6 TEU 
could be used to such purposes. However, one might still argue what content the 
new provision should have. If the amendment increases new competences to the 
Union, it would still infringe one of the conditions on the simplified amendment 
procedure. On the contrary, if it relates to institutional issues, which are also 
mentioned in article 48 paragraph 6 TEU itself – “institutional changes in the 
monetary area” –, a simplified amendment would be possible.  
Arguably, the simplified procedure could be also used to revise some more 
problematic Treaty provisions such as articles 123 or 125 TFEU by providing 
exceptions to the prohibition contained thereof.68 However, the reasoning of the 
Court appears too cautious and Pringle does not explain better what the threshold for 
“indirect effects” is.   
Third, paragraph 56 contains also an interesting “policy” development as compared 
to former jurisprudence. It is the first time that the Court interprets the concept of 
“stability of the euro area as a whole” as the main objective of the ESM. This is 
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“clearly distinct from the objective of maintaining price stability”,69 the main objective 
of the monetary policy. The expression “stability of the euro area as a whole” is 
contained in the first sentence of article 3 of the ESMT as well as in the new indent of 
article 136 TFEU. The Court’s interpretation focuses on a new objective pursued by 
the Eurozone that paves the way to a future refocusing of the economic policy. 
However, the judgment fails to give more clarifications on it. This lack of reasoning 
opens a number of questions. Is “the stability of the euro area as a whole” something 
more or less than price stability? Is it an objective pertaining only and exclusively to 
the economic policy? The Court affirms that the ESM can have some indirect effects 
for the monetary policy. However, it does not specify what these effects are. Further, 
what is the relationship between “coordination and economic policy” and “economic 
policy”? It is submitted that the Court interprets the ESM as an instrument within the 
“economic policy”,70 but it does not give enough clues on how the ESM relates to the 
Union framework. Arguably, Pringle does not give answers to these questions. 
However, the interpretation of the expression “stability of the euro area as a whole” 
results in a very innovate assertion by the Court that needs to be clarified in future 
now that it is also contained in a Treaty provision.  
Finally, as to whether the revision procedure increases the competences conferred 
on the Union in the Treaties, the answer of the Court is, arguably, far less reasoned 
and motivated. Conferring new competences can be made by express Treaty 
provisions that establish legal basis for the Union to take action or through implied 
powers. The solution of the Court appears very cautious. The judgment limits to say 
that the amendment does not confer any new competence on the Union. The 
amendment does not add any Union legal basis or any possible role for the Union’s 
institutions.71 As such, the Court does not take a purposive interpretation, but keeps 
a prudent, even a status quo, interpretation on the potentials of the ESM and on the 
possibility to incorporate it into the EU Treaty in future. The very careful approach of 
the Court might be explained by the political pressure put by the case at issue. A 
more open reading would have been to argue that the Treaty amendment acts as a 
first step, in emergency situations and under “strict conditionality”, to allow further 
Treaty amendments without infringing article 48 paragraph 6 TEU.  
Overall, the judgment sheds important lights on use of the simplified revision 
procedure under article 48 paragraph 6 TEU in future. To some extent the Court has 
opted for an extensive reading of this article that could allow for future revisions in the 
EMU Title so long as the Treaty revision does not touch the core of monetary policy.    
 
4.2.3 Articles 122, 123 and 125 TFEU: real limits to the establishment of permanent 
assistance mechanisms between Member States? 
As recalled before, the ESM has been established outside the Union legal 
framework. This is because the Union framework does not contain any specific 
provision that allowed the establishment of permanent financial assistance 
mechanisms between Eurozone Member States. To that extent, articles 122, 123 
and 125 TFEU come into question. These will be analysed in turn. 
 
4.2.3.1 The ESM Treaty and Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU 
Article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU provides that “where a Member State is in difficulties 
or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties (...), the Council, on a proposal from 
the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to 
the Member State concerned. (...)”. The use of this provision is limited to natural 
disasters or similar occurrences. A strict reading of this provision would run counter 
its use in other circumstances. However, the crisis has made reference to this 
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provision in a wider sense to provide ad hoc financial assistance to Member States in 
distress.72 In particular, it was used to establish the EFSM.73 Article 122 paragraph 2 
allows for the use of special “Union financial assistance” to the benefit of a Member 
State “in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties”. The special 
nature of the provision cannot act as a carte blanche to provide any kind of financial 
support, given the special conditions set out in that article. As such, it could not be 
stretched as much as to establish the ESM. This would clearly run counter the scope 
of the provision mainly because of the permanent nature of the ESM.  
Pringle examines whether article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU would run counter the 
establishment of the ESMT. The Court adopts a strict reading on the limits of article 
122 TFEU which follows the strict views of the Heads of State and Government on 
the future use of article 122 TFEU. The Commission’ position was divergent. This 
discrepancy can be implicitly seen from the Conclusions of the meeting of 16 and 17 
December 2010 where only the Heads of State and Government are mentioned and 
not the European Council comprising also the President of the Commission.74 The 
Court follows the strict line of the Heads of State and Government by excluding that 
“article 122 (2) TFEU (...) constitute an appropriate legal basis for the establishment 
of a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged in [Decision 199/2011].”75 In other 
words, the judgment does not recognize that that article might be used, more 
generally, as the legal basis to provide permanent - and not temporary - financial 
assistance to Member States in serious difficulty in the Eurozone. Some authors 
have expressed the same concern on the use of article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU.76 
Before the judgment they argued that article 122 TFEU has a limited scope and 
cannot give ground to the establishment of permanent mechanisms of the kind 
envisaged.77 The Court’s approach distances the ESM, a permanent financial 
assistance mechanism, from any possible encroachment with article 122 paragraph 2 
TFEU. The reference to article 122 paragraph 2 should be made only when support 
is provided to a Member State in temporary financial difficulties and not to create a 
permanent facility to assist Member States in distress. However, one might question 
whether article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU is really useful to provide a ESM-kind financial 
assistance. The system of own resources in the EU budget is not sufficient to 
safeguard government debts of big Member States. The EU budget does not have 
sufficient funds to provide the required financial assistance to big economies in the 
Eurozone.78 Member States needed to establish an international organisation to 
provide robust assistance going beyond “the margin available under the own 
resources ceiling for payment appropriations” of the EFSM.79 This shows that stability 
mechanisms for robust assistance to Member States require funds that are not 
currently available under the EU budget and thus would not come within the scope of 
application of article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU..  
Overall, Pringle confirms that article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU is a very special 
provision. To some extent, this is a regrettable step as the Court could have avoided 
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such a firm view on this article. In this way, the Court excludes that article 122 
paragraph 2 TFEU would come into play as a legal basis to create other forms of 
financial assistance under European Union law in future. It is true that the 
introduction of article 136 paragraph 3 TFEU allows for the use of permanent 
financial assistance mechanisms between Member States. However, the Court’s 
approach on the use of article 122 paragraph 2 TFUE appears too severe. It is 
submitted that the Court should not have been so clear-cut to limit the use of article 
122 paragraph 2 TFEU.   
 
4.2.3.2 The ESM Treaty and article 123 TFEU 
Article 123 TFEU prohibits “[o]verdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with 
the European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (...) in 
favour of (...) Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from 
them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments”. 
Pringle makes a reference also to article 123 TFEU80. However, both the A.G. view 
and the judgment fail to provide legal certainty on the terms contained in this article. 
The Court simply excludes that financial assistance between Member States of the 
ESM is covered by that provision. The choice of the Court is cautious as it prefers to 
assess only forms of financial assistance between Member States. The judgment 
neither gives indications on the terms used in article 123 TFEU nor specifies what 
limits this article entails. Thus, it still cannot be inferred from Pringle whether some 
forms of ECB credit facilities would be compatible with article 123 TFEU. There are at 
least two options that need some scrutiny.  
First, on 2 August 2012 the ECB announced that it would undertake the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme 81 as a purchase of government-issued 
bonds maturing in 1 to 3 years in the secondary market. The ECB can exercise 
OMTs once the Eurozone Member State asks for financial assistance. This 
announcement followed Draghi’s public speech where he declared that “[w]ithin our 
mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”.82 So far the 
OMT programme has only been announced and has not yet been exercised. It has 
been demonstrated that the effects of the announcement has been beneficial to 
stabilize the markets, but it is still questionable whether the OMT programme is 
compatible under article 123 TFEU.83 It is submitted that the OMT programme is 
feasible as it acts only as a purchase in the secondary market and acts as a crisis-
tailored instrument for intervention. In the next months the German Constitutional 
Court will decide on the compatibility of the OMTs programme with the German 
Constitution.84 There may be also the possibility that the German Constitutional Court 
refers, for the first time, to the ECJ the case as it lacks the powers to assess the 
legality of the ECB mandate. In such case, the ECJ may be called to rule on the OMT 
and the ECB mandate. The Karlsruhe decision is expected to provide an essential 
answer to the feasibility of the OMTs, but it is not excluded that future ECJ case law 
might provide some interpretation of article 123 TFEU.  
Second, the ESMT envisages the possibility of borrowing capital “from banks, 
financial institutions or other persons or institutions for the performance of its 
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purpose”.85 The ESMT provision does not set any limits as to the threshold to borrow 
capital. It is submitted that the ECB comes within the term “banks” and that the ECB 
could be used as the lending institution for capitals to the ESM. In other words, the 
ECB could become the lender of capitals to the ESM. However, so far some Member 
States, most notably Germany, have opposed the power to grant this unlimited 
banking license to the ESM.86 In particular, the use of the ECB capital to the ESM 
would certainly question the compatibility under article 123 TFEU. However, in the 
longer term this option would grant safety nets for the safeguard of Member States’ 
public finances. Neither the AG’s view nor the judgment give indications on this 
ESMT provision and its potential. It is clear that the creation of an unlimited banking 
license to the ESM by the ECB would require a Treaty change as article 123 TFEU 
does not allow this operation. However, the potential for giving “real teeth” to the 
ESM are on the table.  
 
4.2.3.3 The ESM Treaty and article 125 TFEU 
More importantly, the Pringle case assesses, for the first time, the no bail out clause 
under article 125 TFEU. Before commenting on the judgment, we will first recall the 
provision and the doctrinal debate on it.  
Article 125 TFEU contains the ban to the assumption of commitments by Member 
States between each other. It states that the “Union shall not be liable for or assume 
the commitments (...) of any Member State, (...). A Member State shall not be liable 
for or assume the commitments (...) of another Member State, (...)”. This provision 
was inserted in the Treaty of Maastricht to ensure that the Member States follow a 
sound budgetary discipline.87  
So far, article 125 TFEU has proven to be the real “evil” for any possible 
mutualisation of public debt. Doctrinal positions so far on it have been divergent. 
Shortly after the entry into force of this provision, Smits argued that the no bail out 
clause is an essential element of the budgetary code if the Union and, thus, Member 
States are “on their own” as to their budgetary commitments. He underlined that “the 
rationale for the prohibition is (...) the application of full market rigour to the activities 
of Governments”.88 More recently, in the context of the current financial crisis, 
different positions have arisen on the recent crisis measures taken in Europe. 
Rueffert argued that the bilateral loans to Greece in 2010 and the establishment of 
the ESFS were in breach of EU law because they would run counter article 125 
TFEU.89 More correctly, Smits suggested that the markets have yet not been a 
reliable instruments to discipline financial assistance to Member States in difficulties 
and that, given the changed circumstances, a different view o the EMU rules is 
needed.90 Some others have tried to give a narrower interpretation of the no bail out 
provision as “it aims to force Member States to comply with their budgetary discipline 
following the logics of the markets when incurring public debts”.91 Louis sustained 
that in exceptional circumstances the no bail out can be potentially overturned “if the 
situation (...) degenerates into an asymmetric shock or a shock common to a number 
of Member States”.92 Nonetheless, as affirmed by the more cautious position of 
Palmstorfer, the wording and the systematic reading of the provision “covers and 
bans all forms of financial assistance given by the European Union or through a 
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Member State to another”. Thus, the Greek loan facility, the ESFS and the ESM 
would run counter article 125 TFEU.93 Overall, the doctrinal position appears 
divergent as to the possible implications of article 125 TFEU on financial assistance 
mechanisms. 
Pringle has offered the Court the chance to express itself for the first time on article 
125 TFEU and, in particular, to interpret the ESM in light of article 125 TFEU. The 
Court considers that article 125 TFEU does not preclude the adoption and ratification 
of the ESMT. This conclusion is made through a certain number of arguments that 
need a careful assessment. 
First, the Court conducts a literal interpretation of article 125 TFUE and concludes 
that Member States are not prohibited from granting any form of financial assistance 
whatever to another Member State.94 This result is achieved through a combined 
reading of article 125 TFEU together with article 122 paragraph 2 TFEU and article 
123 TFEU. Correctly, the Court shows that financial assistance between Member 
States is allowed by some Treaty provisions even if article 125 TFEU provides for the 
no bail out clause. It is an important point as the Court considers that, 
notwithstanding the no bail out clause, financial assistance between Member States 
is possible.  
Second, the Court examines the objective of article 125 TFEU. Paragraph 135 
affirms that article 125 FEU serves to ensure that Member States maintain budgetary 
discipline. This equals to say that article 125 TFEU serves as a provision to 
guarantee the budgetary discipline of the Member States and not, strictly speaking, 
to ban financial assistance between them. However, this is not an absolute invitation 
to provide financial assistance instruments. In fact, the Court requires that such 
intervention is indispensable for the safeguarding of the financial stability of the euro 
area as a whole and that it is subject to strict conditionality.95 The arguments of the 
Court are based on the different provisions contained in the ESMT according to 
which financial assistance is given only if special conditions are respected. This is not 
to say that Member States cannot provide assistance between each others. Indeed, 
one might take two different views on this issue.  
On the one hand, it can be argued that the Court has clearly set the maximum limits 
on the possible exceptions to article 125 TFEU. Member States cannot be liable for 
debts of other Member States, but they can only provide loans or similar means on 
condition that the beneficiary rests fully liable with its commitments.  
On the other hand, provided that assistance is given to the benefit of the “financial 
stability of the euro as a whole” and that strict conditionality is respected, Member 
State can voluntarily make use of financial assistance instruments without infringing 
article 125 TFEU and to the extent that the prefer.  
Correctly, De Witte and Beukers argue that the interpretation of article 125 TFEU in 
Pringle is based both on the requirement of indispensability and conditionality of 
intervention.96 However, I would put more emphasis on the actual limits on Member 
States’ commitments which flow from article 125 TFEU. It is submitted that the Court 
legitimizes Member States’ money transfers to bail out other Member States in 
distress without infringing EU law.97  
It is true that the recipient Member State remains fully responsible to its creditors for 
any financial commitments98. Financial assistance amounts to the creation of a new 
debt to the ESM and not to the establishment of debt liabilities assumed by the 
assisting Member States. We are still not in a transfer Union with a mutualisation of 
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public debts.99 The ESM does not provide neither for the joint nor for the joint and 
several liability of the assisting Member States. It is not an international organisation 
which provides for stability bonds.100 The assisted Member State remains fully 
responsible for its commitments.  
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the Court legitimizes, if not even invites, Member 
States to bail out each other without necessarily infringing the Treaty. This is 
because the purpose of article 125 TFEU is essentially to assure that “the incentive 
of the recipient Member State to conduct sound budgetary policy is [not] 
diminished”101 and not to prohibit financial assistance between Member States as 
such. If the Court’s judgment is welcome as it held that the ESM is compatible with 
the no bail out clause, regrettably, it does not appear as convincing as the reading of 
the A.G.’s view. First, the A.G. stated that article 125 TFEU would not prohibit any 
form of financial support to a Member State.102 In a more appealing way, she argued 
that the purpose of article 125 TFEU is to assure that “the disciplinary effect of 
interest rate spreads on the capital markets according to the individual financial 
positions of Member States”.103 Does this mean that the no bail out provision is 
concerned with market discipline of Member States rather than with budgetary 
discipline?104 It appears that article 125 TFEU runs primarily counter Member State’s 
arrangements which would subvert the credibility of the individual financial position of 
Member States. Second, the A. G.’s view argued that an extensive reading of the 
provision would run counter the principles of sovereignty and solidarity of the 
Member States. Such argument equals to say that an extensive reading of the no bail 
out clause would infringe two principles in the EU that, admittedly, “rank as of at least 
equal importance to Article 125 TFEU”.105 The judgment mentions neither of them to 
counteract an extensive reading of article 125 TFEU. This is regrettable as the Court 
would have showed more activism in legitimizing a restrictive reading of article 125 
TFEU.  
If focus on limitations to article 125 TFEU are on the ways in which Member States 
provide financial assistance, conditionality and even more indispensability of financial 
intervention have less importance than what one could see at first sight. As to the 
former, conditions attached to the MoU are essential to granting financial assistance 
in compliance with EU law, but can go further or can be different from what is 
required under the economic policy provisions contained in the Treaty. It is true that 
article 13 ESMT requires strict conditionality of intervention. However, it is argued 
that conditionality is a flexible concept which depends on the nature of each 
intervention. As to the latter, indispensability does not seem so much essential. It is 
true that the ESM was created to guarantee the stability of the euro and that Article 
136 paragraph 3 TFEU requires that intervention can be activated “if indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole”. However, the recent Cypriot bail 
out did not appear to be such a serious threat to the financial stability of the euro as a 
whole. Even if the Eurogroup stated that “financial assistance to Cyprus is warranted 
to safeguard financial stability (...) to the euro area as a whole”106, it is submitted that 
indispensability of intervention was not essential to safeguard the currency union as 
such. As shown by the Cypriot bail out, the ESM funds can be used also to allow a 
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Member State in difficulty not to exit the Eurozone.107 This questions whether 
indispensability of intervention is essential to trigger the ESM funds.   
 
Overall, the Court’s approach on article 125 TFEU is welcome as it gives some 
leeway to assure financial assistance between Member States beyond a strict 
reading of article 125 TFEU. Despite not being as appealing as the A.G.’s view, the 
Court establishes that Member States can provide financial resources to another 
Member State without breaching the no bail out prohibition. This is possible so long 
as such intervention is in line with sound budgetary discipline and with the 
indispensability to safeguard the stability of the euro as a whole. However, it has 
been demonstrated that these two conditions can become rather flexible in their 
application. The real limit of the no bail out clause is the nature of liability of the 
financial instrument.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The judicial endorsement of the ESMT by the ECJ was highly expected. This 
contribution has shown that this judgment is welcome and satisfactory in light of 
future developments along the financial crisis. Among others, it clarifies three issues 
in the current debt crisis era.  
First, it is the first time that the Court pronounces itself on the rules related to the new 
crisis-related measure in light of the economic and monetary provisions contained in 
the Treaty. The Court’s approach is satisfactory as it adopts a lenient judicial control 
over the conclusion and ratification of an international Treaty to provide financial 
assistance to Eurozone Member States. An opposite solution would have 
jeopardized the project of monetary union in Europe.  
Second, the judgment allows the use of the simplified revision procedure pursuant to 
article 48 TEU in the context of the economic policy. This is a seminal point as the 
Court has clarified to what extent the simplified revision procedure might be used to 
change the Treaty. The judgment is an important precedent to future simplified 
revisions of the Treaty provisions on the EMU so long as the changes do not affect 
the core part of the monetary policy competence. It has been argued that new 
provisions could be inserted to amend the Treaty with a view to establish the Banking 
Union without necessarily recurring to the ordinary revision procedure.   
Third and perhaps most importantly, the Pringle case illustrates how stability 
mechanisms to support Member States in financial distress can be effective tools to 
provide liquidity in the European markets. By endorsing the ESMT, the ECJ assures 
that Member States can take financial measures to support each other, 
notwithstanding the straightjacket of the no bail out clause. The result is that Member 
States can establish financial arrangements which can be used beyond a strict 
reading of article 125 TFEU. In essence, the judgment gives flexibility to Member 
States’ arrangements in providing financial support to each other.  
To conclude, Pringle will be remembered as the first landmark decision in which the 
Court has endorsed financial assistance between Member States as a “catalyst” to 
increase further financial, economic and perhaps political interconnection between 
Member States. 
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